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This paper investigates previously unresearched issues pertaining to the well-
known Chilean innovations in Social Security.  Previous empirical studies of the 
Chilean system used aggregate and macro data, without attention to individual 
heterogeneity. This study uses new household survey data, linked with Social 
Security records for over 20 years, to analyze selected reform issues related to 
social security coverage and the density and continuity of contributions to the 
social security system. The results lead to a better understanding of the 
participation determinants and the distributional aspects of the Chilean system, 
lay the groundwork for policy changes, and illuminate implications of the system 














 1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates some previously unresearched issues pertaining to the well-
known Chilean innovations in pensions and Social Security. Though some aspects of 
the Chilean experience have been studied extensively, these studies to date have 
been limited to the analysis of aggregate and macro data, without focusing on 
individual heterogeneity among agents affected by the system. This study uses 
household survey data to analyze social security coverage and the density and 
continuity of contributions to the Social Security system. The results lead to a better 
understanding of the Chilean system, laying the groundwork for policy changes, and 
illuminating some important implications of the system for other countries 
throughout the world, including the United States, which are considering reforming 
their Social Security systems in ways that may be parallel to certain important 
elements of the Chilean system. 
 
Pension systems often are based on compulsory contributions that certain groups 
such as salaried workers make with the objectives of assuring their post-retirement 
income needs and providing coverage in the event of unforeseen circumstances that 
may hinder their earnings. Experience clearly indicates that, independently of the 
specific organization of the pension system, to protect those in the bottom of the 
income and wealth distributions, it is necessary to guarantee a basic minimum 
coverage, an aspect of social security systems that has been especially emphasized 
in the analysis of social security systems in Latin America in general (Mesa-Lago, 
1985) and in Chile in particular (Arellano, 1985). However, beyond those basic 
guarantees, there are important questions about participation in voluntary systems 
that may substantially affect the distributional implications of the system. 
 
Social Security systems (especially their pension components) were subject to 
structural reforms in Latin America in the 1990´s. Different social security schemes 
have been implemented in the region, with one common denominator, the 
introduction of individual contributions into individual pension accounts (see e.g. 
Mesa-Lago, 1994; 1996; and 1998; and Bonilla and Conte-Grand, 1998). Thus, it is 
particularly relevant to study the impact that these profound reforms have had on 
the coverage of the pension systems.   
 
Within this context, the analysis of the Chilean case is particularly interesting. As is 
well known, Chile pioneered Social Security and pension reforms in a number of 
dimensions. The Chilean Individual Pension System is compulsory for salaried 
workers while it is optional for the self-employed. When it was instituted existing 
workers had to choose whether to remain in the old pay-as-you-go system or switch 
to the new system; however, new workers entered the new system directly. Workers 
affiliate to one of the private pension funds (Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones, AFP) where they have an individual pension account. Wageworkers are 
mandated to contribute 10% of their monthly earnings plus an additional 
contribution to cover administrative costs and disability and survivor insurance. 
Individual funds are invested by the AFP’s in a portfolio of previously authorized 
assets. Upon retirement, individuals use their accumulated funds to calculate the 
pension amount according to different schemes. Affiliates with a minimum of 20 
years of contributions are entitled to receive a pension amount no less than the 
minimum pension set by the government. 
 
Chile initiated its pension system reform in 1981, and therefore possesses over a 
decade of experience more with these reforms than do other Latin American countries – and of course a much stronger empirical basis for investigating the 
impact of these reforms than countries such as the United States that are currently 
considering implementing some reforms akin to those introduced two decades ago in 
Chile.  For this reason, increasing our understanding of the Chilean system is 
valuable not only because it may have important implications for modifying the 
Chilean system, but also because it may be informative about longer-run implications 
of such a system for other countries. 
 
In addition, the topic of this paper is further justified by the worrying fact that, while 
in 1965 over 70% of the population was covered, by 1999 coverage had fallen to 
less than 60% (Arellano, 1985 and Arenas de Mesa, 2000). Furthermore, since 1981, 
substantial changes have also occurred in policies that have transformed the labor 
market, which should be considered in parallel with the Social Security system.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the changes in the coverage of the social security 
system on, for example, the social conditions of the pension holders, as well as on 
fiscal expenditure, these coverage changes have not been investigated sufficiently 
despite the considerable attention given both in Chile and abroad to the innovations 
in the Chilean system.  
 
This paper reviews the issue of coverage in the new Chilean pension system. Section 
II provides a general overview of the pension system reform in Chile. Section III 
characterizes the population covered by the pension system in Chile using household 
surveys. Section IV characterizes and analyzes the determinants of the density of 
social security contributions and its dynamics. Finally, section V presents conclusions 
and policy implications. 
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2. Pension system reforms and the case of Chile 
 
A major objective of all the pension reforms that have swept across Latin America 
over the last decade has been to solve or to avoid fundamental financial imbalances. 
Replacing the conventional public pay-as-you-go defined benefit system (PAYG-DB) 
with private fully funded defined contribution schemes (FF-DC) appeared as a radical 
yet definite solution to actuarial disequilibria that otherwise would have required an 
unbearable increase in contribution rates, a reduction in benefits, or a growing drain 
on scarce public resources.  
 
After the seminal experience of Chile, that substituted a public PAYG-DB system 
formed by a myriad of pension funds with a unified FF-DC pension system based on 
individual capital accounts and private administration in the early 1980s, seven other 
countries in Latin American have followed suit. During the 1990’s Peru, Colombia, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia and El Salvador have carried out reforms that 
have adopted FF-DC either as the core or as a fundamental pillar of new pension 
systems. 
 
By funding future benefits through accumulated contributions, the authorities that 
advocated the move towards FF-DC schemes expected to provide a permanent 
solution to the periodic financial crises that plagued social security systems in the 
past. Such reforms also implied withdrawing from the agenda of politicians the 
possibility of granting disproportionate benefits to retirees at the expense of younger 
generations of workers. 
 
Pension reforms were expected to have a major beneficial impact on public finances 
in the long run, but transition to the new regimes was a different story. Since 
contributions under the new system would no longer be available to fund pension 
payments to retirees of the PAYG system, the government would have to fund them 
from treasury funds, thus generating a substantial financial gap over a number of 
years. A fast transition from PAYG-DB to FF-DC systems would also require some 
recognition of accrued pension rights to those workers that moved into the new 
system after contributing to the old one. Pension reforms thus involved 
acknowledging the implicit liabilities accrued by the government both to retired and 
active workers. This feature of transition was recognized by international financial 
institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank that 
offered support to smooth the financial gap. 
 
In addition, most of the reforms are not entirely pure in the sense of transforming a 
purely public PAYG-DB into a completely private FF-DC system. Due to either political 
compromise or to the need to keep some redistributive component, many of these 
reforms have retained some public responsibilities either in the form of a guaranteed 
minimum benefit, a basic pension funded under a traditional PAYG scheme or 
supplementary benefits. 
 
The fiscal response to pension reforms is indeed a key factor in determining their 
success because they supplement the effect of such reforms on private savings. 
While the introduction of a FF-DC system will undoubtedly increase private savings 
(except under extreme Ricardian equivalence and perfect financial markets), national 
net savings will only increase as long as the reform does not prompt an equivalent 
reduction in public savings. Public savings, in turn, will be affected by and react to 
the pension reform itself. 
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Chile may provide a telling example of the fiscal complexities and the social security 
coverage associated with  pension reforms. Chile, as noted, was the first country in 
the world that completely substituted the old public PAYG-DB scheme with a new 
private FF-DC individual pension system.  The scope, depth and speed of the Chilean 
reform has attracted worldwide attention, and is having significant influence in Latin 
America and other countries (see the cases of Latin American countries in Mesa-
Lago, 1996a; the United States in Diamond, 1996, and Feldstein, 1996; and Eastern 
European countries in Holzmann 1994). 
 
But despite its radical nature, the Chilean reform steered far from completely 
eliminating the public sector from the pension system. The public sector retained a 
substantial role not only as regulator and with ultimate responsiblity for the 
functioning of the system, but also kept responsibility for: (a) paying the pensions of 
the old system; (b) honoring the accrued pension rights of workers that moved to 
the new system after contributing to the old through the payment of “recognition 
bonds” at retirement; (c) managing a largely unfunded DB system for the armed 
forces and the police; (d) guaranteeing a minimum benefit under the new system for 
workers that entered at least 20 years of contributions, and (e) providing a minimal 
welfare pension to the extremely poor elderly not eligible for the minimum benefit. 
Of these responsibilities, only the first two are temporary in nature but all of them 
draw on public funds. 
 
The Chilean pension reform provides an interesting example to study the process of 
switching from a PAYG to a FF pension system. During the transition between social 
security systems, careful consideration should be given to the social security 
coverage of the pension reform because public expenditure projections on minimum 
pensions crucially depend on the assumption of the density of contributions, that is, 
the percentage of the working-life period the worker contributes to the pension 
system. Higher densities of contributions imply higher capital accumulation and 
higher benefits and, consequently, lower fiscal outlays on minimum pensions.  
 
The Chilean reform 
 
Chile pioneered the development of social security in Latin America, establishing its 
first national social insurance fund in 1924.  The public pension system that evolved 
thereafter was fragmented and stratified, only moderately progressive and generated 
a growing fiscal burden. Governments of diverse political creeds unsuccessfully tried 
to reform this system but their attempts were blocked by powerful interest groups 
(Arellano 1985; Mesa-Lago 1994). 
 
By the end of the 1970’s, the pension system was diagnosed as bankrupt and the 
military government committed itself to carry out major reforms. A first wave of 
reforms rationalized the PAYG system by increasing the retirement age, raising 
contribution rates and eliminating the most abusive special schemes. But this proved 
only to set the basis for a more radical reform.  
 
A private FF pension system was implemented in 1980 and began operating in May 
1981 to replace the public PAYG scheme. The new Chilean system is compulsory for 
salaried workers but optional for the self-employed. When it was instituted, existing 
workers had to choose whether to remain in the old PAYGO system (unified in the 
Instituto de Normalización Previsional, INP) or change to the new system, with credit 
given for money paid into the old system in the form of a transferable Recognition 
  4Bond (RB), a financial instrument redeemed by the state to the insured at the 
moment of retirement and added to the fund to purchase the retirement annuity.
1 It 
has been estimated that, during the transitional period (approximately 30 years), the 
RB will account for between 50% and 70% of the total capital accumulated by the 
insured (Arellano 1985; Arenas de Mesa and Marcel 1993). New formal sector 
workers were compulsorily enrolled in the new system.  
 
The new system is a defined-contribution scheme based on a private mandatory 
savings/pension plan. Workers must contribute 10% of their monthly earnings during 
their working life to an individual account managed by a private pension fund 
administrator (AFP). AFP’s charge fees to cover administrative costs and in addition, 
workers pay a premium for commercial insurance that covers survival and disability 
benefits. Pensions are funded by the worker’s individual capitalized fund at the time 
of retirement, which may then be used to purchase an annuity from insurance 
companies. Pensions thus depend on the accumulated contributions of the affiliate 
over his/her working life, the yield obtained by the AFP from investing this fund in 
the financial markets, life expectancy factors by gender, and the number, age and 
life expectancy of dependants.  
 
All pension system variables (pension funds, yields, benefits) are measured in 
"unidades de fomento" (UF), an accounting unit indexed to inflation. Thus, pensions 
are automatically inflation-adjusted, therefore solving a long-standing and serious 
problem of Chilean social insurance. Males can retire at the age of 65 and females at 
60. Unlike the previous system, where the management was in the hands of the 
public sector, the new system is managed by specialized private corporations (AFP’s) 
dedicated exclusively to that role. However, the new private pension system is 
strictly regulated by the government through a Superintendence (Regulatory 
Authority). Moreover, the state provides numerous guarantees, including a minimum 
pension for all people insured who have accumulated 20 or more years of 
contributions throughout his/her working-life. Unlike regular pensions, however, the 
minimum pension is not indexed against inflation but is instead periodically adjusted 
by the government. 
 
Between 1981-2003, the accumulated pension funds increased five-fold totaling 
more than U.S. $30 billion or approximately 40% of GDP in 2003. The real annual 
rate of return of the pension funds has averaged 11% in the 1981-2003 period. The 
main exceptions were in 1995 and 1998 when the real rate of return of the pension 
funds fell to -2.5% and -1.1% respectively. However, with similarly favorable 
conditions as in the 1981-2003 period, the funds are expected to reach 100% of the 
Chilean GDP by the year 2030.  Thus, the new pension system has become a key 
feature of the Chilean economy and it has had a major economic impact on the 
development and growth of financial markets. 
 
Much literature has appeared on the new Chilean pensions system, which is 
understandable given its novelty (see, e.g., Cheyre, 1988; Iglesias and Acuña, 1991; 
Baeza and Margozzini, 1995 and SAFP, 1998).  Diamond (1994), Diamond and 
Valdés-Prieto (1994), Arenas de Mesa (1997) and Mesa-Lago and Arenas de Mesa 
(1998), for example, have evaluated some implementational and operational aspects 
of the new Chilean pension system. However, a common characteristic of these 
                                                 
1 The RB is calculated using a formula based on three variables: (i) years of contributions to the public 
system; (ii) earnings; and (iii) annuity factors (Arenas de Mesa and Marcel 1993).  
  5studies, and in general of all the literature on the Chilean pension reform, is the use 
of aggregate and macro-economic information. In fact, the implications of the 
pension system reform on aspects such as private savings are usually deduced from 
simple aggregate correlations of macro-economic indicators (even though the period 
has had a significant number of other reforms) or from simulations carried out on 
general equilibrium models (the pioneering application in this respect was Arrau, 
1991). Even when specific aspects such as the minimum basic pension have been 
analyzed, the analysis has been undertaken by projecting situations for 
representative individuals, without actually having significant empirical information 
and without considering individual heterogeneities that are critical for questions of 
coverage (see, e.g., Wagner, 1991, and Zurita, 1994).  Another line of research has 
placed more emphasis on the fiscal aspects of the reform (see, e.g. Ortúzar, 1988; 
Marcel and Arenas de Mesa, 1992; Arenas de Mesa, 1999). Arenas de Mesa and 
Marcel (1999), for instance, have updated previous estimates on the public finance 
costs associated with the transition (from a pay-as-you-go to the private system) 
and with the guarantee of providing minimum basic pensions. But the basic question 
of coverage has not been considered very much in the analysis of the Chilean 
pension system to date.  
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3. Characterization of the population covered by the pension system in Chile 
 
In this section, we characterize the population covered by the pension system in 
Chile working first from official figures and then using information from household 
surveys that distinguish between contributors and non-contributors. 
 
 
3.1 General Trends 1975-2000 
 
Table 1 reports the number of people contributing to the pension system in Chile 
since 1975 as a percentage of total employment and of the labor force
2. Note the 
large proportion of people who moved from the old pay-as-you-go system (INP) to 
the new system (AFP): in 1982-1983, 7 out of 10 contributors were in the AFP 
system. Moreover, because all new workers have to enter the new system, the AFP’s 




AFP INP Total AFP INP Total
1975 ----- 71.2% 71.2% ----- 61.9% 61.9%
1976 ----- 65.7% 65.7% ----- 57.3% 57.3%
1977 ----- 62.2% 62.2% ----- 54.8% 54.8%
1978 ----- 56.6% 56.6% ----- 48.5% 48.5%
1979 ----- 56.2% 56.2% ----- 48.5% 48.5%
1980 ----- 53.3% 53.3% ----- 47.8% 47.8%
1981 n.d. 18.4% n.d. n.d. 16.3% n.d.
1982 36.0% 16.6% 52.6% 29.0% 13.4% 42.3%
1983 38.2% 14.9% 53.1% 33.5% 13.0% 46.6%
1984 40.6% 13.7% 54.3% 35.0% 11.8% 46.8%
1985 44.0% 12.8% 56.9% 38.8% 11.3% 50.1%
1986 45.9% 11.6% 57.5% 41.1% 10.4% 51.6%
1987 50.6% 11.0% 61.6% 45.7% 10.0% 55.7%
1988 50.6% 9.8% 60.4% 46.6% 9.0% 55.6%
1989 50.8% 8.7% 59.5% 47.2% 8.1% 55.3%
1990 50.6% 8.1% 58.7% 46.8% 7.5% 54.4%
1991 53.7% 7.6% 61.3% 49.9% 7.0% 56.9%
1992 55.3% 6.9% 62.2% 51.8% 6.5% 58.3%
1993 54.6% 6.0% 60.7% 51.1% 5.7% 56.8%
1994 56.2% 5.5% 61.7% 51.8% 5.0% 56.9%
1995 57.2% 5.5% 62.7% 53.5% 5.1% 58.6%
1996 58.9% 4.9% 63.8% 55.7% 4.6% 60.4%
1997 61.3% 4.4% 65.6% 58.0% 4.1% 62.1%
1998 58.0% 4.2% 62.2% 53.8% 3.9% 57.7%
1999 60.4% 4.2% 64.6% 55.0% 3.9% 58.9%
2000 59.4% 4.2% 63.6% 54.5% 3.9% 58.4%
Source: Arenas de Mesa (2000) y Arellano (1985).
(Contributors/Employment) (Contributors/Labor Force)
Coverage Index 2 Coverage Index 1
Table 1
Pension System Coverage in Chile: 1975-2000
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2 Table 1 uses figures of contributors from official social security sources (INP in the case of the old 
system and Superintendencia de AFP for the new pension system) and labor force statistics coming from 
the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE).  
In 1975, the coverage index 1 was over 70% (and according to Arellano, 1985, this 
was also the figure between 1965 and 1975). It then dropped continuously down to 
around 53% at the beginning of the new system in 1981. Later, coverage picked up 
to 62% in 1987 and reached 64-65% in the last couple of years covered in the table. 
Therefore, when compared with the 1975 figures, 20 years of the new system have 
not actually led to an increase in coverage. 
 
This lack of substantial change in coverage generally has not been recognized 
because coverage index 3 shown in table 2 usually has been reported: that is, the 
number of affiliates (instead of contributors) to the new system as a proportion of 
the total labor force. Contrary to what was shown in Table 1, by this index over 
100% of the labor force would be currently covered in the AFP system. 
 
 
Year Affiliates Labor Force Coverage
Index 3
(a) (b) (c) = (a)/(b)
1981 1.400.000 3.687.900 38.0%
1982 1.440.000 3.660.700 39.3%
1983 1.620.000 3.667.700 44.2%
1984 1.930.353 3.890.700 49.6%
1985 2.283.830 4.018.700 56.8%
1986 2.591.484 4.312.010 60.1%
1987 2.890.680 4.425.330 65.3%
1988 3.183.002 4.656.280 68.4%
1989 3.470.845 4.805.290 72.2%
1990 3.739.542 4.888.590 76.5%
1991 4.109.184 4.983.890 82.4%
1992 4.434.795 5.199.800 85.3%
1993 4.708.840 5.458.990 86.3%
1994 5.014.444 5.553.830 90.3%
1995 5.320.913 5.538.240 96.1%
1996 5.571.482 5.600.670 99.5%
1997 5.780.400 5.683.820 101.7%
1998 5.966.143 5.851.510 102.0%
1999 6.105.731 5.933.560 102.9%
2000 6.280.191 5.870.880 107.0%
Source: Arenas de Mesa (2000).
Table 2


























However, coverage index 3 is inadequate because, in the new pension system, the 
affiliation condition is obtained automatically when someone works in the formal 
sector and makes a contribution to the pension system. Even if a person has only 
contributed one month in a period of 20 years, such a person will nevertheless 
appear as affiliated in table 2. Therefore, affiliation is a very misleading index of  
being covered in the new pension system. 
  
Coverage indexes 1 and 2 are also open to criticism because they give no 
information on the density and continuity of contributions. Even when only 
considering those who are actively contributing to the pension system and who are 
employed in some point in time (covered in both indexes), accumulated savings may 
be insufficient. Despite these limitations, in this section we will continue working with 
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section 4 of the paper we will use information from a new household survey to 
characterize the density of contributions. 
 
Some publications also have interpreted available statistics as showing higher 
pension coverage for women relative to men in the AFP system, either using index 1 
or 2. In fact, when index 2 is used, coverage increased in the 1986-2000 period from 
37% to 51% for women and from 34% to 45% for men. Barrientos (1998) concludes 
that this feature contrasts with the experience of developed countries where a 
coverage gender gap against women can be found; in fact, he goes further and 
predicts that a wave of reforms in pension systems along the lines of the Chilean 
system would contribute to a reduction in the gender gap in coverage.  
 
The assertion that coverage for women is higher will be tested in section 3.2 using 
household survey data. However, even if we could confirm that coverage is higher 
for women (which will not be the case), it is not possible to attribute the causality to 
the new pension system. To begin with, we don’t have any information on gender 
gaps in pension coverage before 1981 to be able to compare the current situation 
with the old system. Secondly, the differential in gender gap coverage between Chile 
and other developed countries cannot easily be attributed to the new pension system 
when other important factors are not controlled (among them, different rules on the 
mandatory character of contributions and large differences in the labor force 
participation of women). At the same time, there is the usual selection issue when 
we consider female labor force participation. Therefore, in section 4 we will 
investigate the gender gap in coverage as related to density of contributions.  
 
 
3.2. Characterizing pension coverage using household surveys: 1992-2000 
 
In this section we use individual information from the National Socio-economic 
Characterization Surveys (CASEN) for the years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 
2000 to contribute to the debate on pension coverage . The CASEN survey is 
significant because it provides a body of data on households that is representative on 
a regional as well as on a national level. The surveys are carried out in November of 
each year and provide cross-sectional information on approximately 130 thousand 
people a year. This survey is carried out by the Survey Unit of the Economics 
Department of the University of Chile on behalf of the Chilean Ministry of Planning 
(MIDEPLAN). 
 
The surveys between 1990 and 1998 included the question: "Are you affiliated to any 
pension system?” moreover, the surveys between 1992 and 2000 included another 
question: "Do you make contributions into any pension system?” The series 
generated on contributors is homogenous over time. However, the questions on 
affiliation between 1990 and 1992 were not asked to the entire working-age 
population. The question on those affiliated to pension systems was only put to 
people actively working in 1990 while in 1992 the question was only put to those not 
working (inactive and unemployed). From 1994, everyone was asked the same 
question, but it was not repeated until the year 2000. These changes limit the  use of 
the information on those affiliated to pension systems in the econometric analysis 
before 1994. However, for the tables included in this section, the total of those 
affiliated was estimated using imputations for the missing information based on the 
evidence from the nearest years. 
 
  9Table 3 provides some pertinent indicators taken from the 1990 to 2000 CASEN 
surveys. As may be seen, the unemployment rate dropped in the 90`s in the period 
under analysis but increased in 1998 and 2000. Through 1998 female labor force 
participation rate increased, though it fell a little in 2000. Likewise, and in contrast to 
the claim by some observers of the labor market of a deteriorating trend in the 
quality and stability of employment, the percentage of workers with a contract 
actually increased significantly through 1994 and though it subsequently declined a 
little, it remained above the 1992 value.  Also the proportion of employees who work 
as wage workers has grown slightly over more of the period, with a slight decline in 
2000.  Therefore, the traditional informal employment measures have dropped in the 
period. 
 
The coverage indicators that use pension system membership rates relative to the 
size of the labor force (affiliates/labor force) are less than 100% on average, in 
contrast to Table 2. However, this indicator is higher for women and indeed exceeds 
100% for 1994-8. Thus the patterns are similar to those in Table 2, though at a 
somewhat lower levels (which may reflect underreporting with self-reporting). 
 
 
Indicator 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Unemployment Rate 8.3% 5.5% 6.7% 5.7% 9.9% 10.2%
Labor Force Participation 52.0% 54.0% 54.5% 54.7% 55.9% 51.6%
Female Labor Force Participation 32.4% 34.1% 35.3% 36.3% 38.8% 36.6%
% of employed with contract 68.7% 71.6% 79.5% 76.5% 75.2% 75.2%
% of employed who are wage workers 66.6% 67.2% 67.1% 68.6% 68.7% 68.1%
Contributors/Employed na 60.7% 64.6% 64.1% 63.4% 62.1%
-Men na 61.2% 65.1% 64.5% 64.0% 63.0%
-Women na 59.8% 63.7% 63.3% 62.2% 60.3%
Contributors/Labor Force na 57.4% 60.3% 60.4% 57.1% 55.7%
-Men na 58.5% 61.4% 61.3% 58.2% 57.1%
-Women na 55.3% 58.2% 58.7% 55.2% 53.4%
Contributors/Population 15 and older na 31.0% 32.9% 33.1% 31.9% 28.8%
-Men na 44.4% 46.4% 45.8% 43.4% 38.7%
-Women na 18.9% 20.6% 21.3% 21.4% 19.5%
Affiliates/Labor Force 81.6% 86.1% 91.0% 95.0% 95.1% na
-Men 74.9% 80.0% 82.8% 86.4% 87.2% na
-Women 96.7% 98.5% 107.0% 111.3% 109.1% na
Affiliates/Population 15 and older 42.4% 46.5% 49.6% 52.0% 53.2% na
-Men 55.2% 60.7% 62.5% 64.5% 65.1% na
-Women 31.3% 33.6% 37.8% 40.4% 42.3% na
Source: Computations using files from CASEN Household Surveys.
na: not available
Table 3

























We think that the indicator of affiliates relative to the working age population (taken 
as the population of 15 years of age and over) is more useful when using data on 
affiliations. Using this data, it is clear that the higher affiliation rate previously 
observed for women was predominantly due to their low participation level. This 
indicator shows that over half the working-age population is affiliated to the pension 
system, with significantly higher rates for men than for women. 
 
As regards the indicators associated with contributors, a similar picture to Table 1 
appears, with an increase in coverage rates between 1992 and 1994-1996. However, 
  10in contrast to the evidence from other studies, in all these cases the coverage 
indicators are slightly higher for men than for women. To reconcile this pattern with 
the opposite one noted above, that the figures from Table 3 include the contributors 
from the old pension system (INP) as well as those in the Defense force and Police 
pension system (these latter are predominantly male) needs to be taken into 
account. The figures for AFP affiliates show similar coverage rates for men and 
women. 
 
The advantages of having household information on an individual level, however, are 
not fully exploited in Table 3. Table 4 shows coverage index 1 (contributors over 
employment) for a group of individual characteristics, which allows better 
understanding as to the factors that are correlated with a greater or lower coverage: 
 
Age groups:   Coverage is highest for the 25 and 29 age group, with  a peak at 
72.0% in 1996 for this age group. Coverage is particularly low for workers of school-
going age (15 to 19 years of age) and for adults 60 or over (a range that includes 
male and female retirement ages). The lower coverage rate observed in those aged 
30 and over relative to those in their 20s probably is related to the lower educational 
levels of older cohorts relative to the younger groups (Bravo and Contreras (2001); 
Bravo and Marinovic (1997)). 
 
Schooling attainment: The above suggestion about the age-schooling-coverage 
pattern is plausible in that a positive relationship is observed between schooling 
levels and pension coverage rates. Only 40-45 out of every 100 low or unskilled 
workers make social security contributions. This contrasts sharply with the 70 to 
75% coverage for workers with a full secondary education (note that workers with 
partial secondary education have coverage rates some 10 to 15 points lower). These 
rates exceed 75% for workers with unfinished higher education (university) or with 
higher technical training, and hover around 85% for workers with completed higher 
education (university).  Given the increasing schooling attainment of recent school-
age cohorts in Chile, the workforce’s average schooling will increase over the next 10 
years; therefore, pension coverage is expected to increase simply for this reason. 
 
Geographical patterns:  There is a clear pattern of a 50% higher coverage in urban 
areas over rural zones. This is consistent with the fact that low coverage rates are  
observed in regions IV, VII, IX and X, all with above average rural populations. In 
contrast, regions XII, II and the Metropolitan, have coverage rates above the 
national average. This pattern is stable over the period of analysis. 
  11 
Variables
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
1.  Total 60.7% 64.6% 64.1% 63.4% 62.2%
2.  Sex:
    -Men 61.2% 65.1% 64.5% 64.0% 63.2%
    -Women 59.8% 63.7% 63.3% 62.2% 60.4%
3.  Age:
    -15-19 years 35.5% 41.5% 36.5% 34.9% 33.6%
    -20-24 years  61.5% 66.1% 65.1% 63.8% 59.5%
    -25-29 years 67.6% 71.2% 72.0% 70.0% 69.1%
    -30-39 years 65.1% 68.7% 68.8% 67.7% 67.4%
    -40-49 years 62.5% 65.7% 64.7% 64.7% 63.5%
    -50-59 years 56.3% 61.6% 59.9% 61.8% 60.8%
    -60 and older 46.5% 46.4% 44.2% 41.9% 40.8%
4.  Schooling:
    -None 39.8% 43.5% 39.3% 39.2% 37.3%
    -Primary Incomplete 47.5% 47.9% 46.3% 44.8% 42.7%
    -Primary Complete 53.2% 54.5% 53.9% 52.2% 53.0%
    -Secondary Incomplete 58.4% 60.8% 61.3% 58.2% 54.9%
    -Secondary Complete 70.1% 73.0% 74.2% 71.5% 69.9%
    -Higher Incomplete 73.7% 74.8% 77.4% 76.3% 75.1%
    -Higher Complete 83.0% 87.7% 83.8% 85.1% 83.3%
5.  Zone:
    -Urban 64.3% 67.7% 67.8% 66.6% 65.0%
    -Rural 43.1% 46.9% 41.9% 41.5% 43.0%
6.  Region:
    - I 69.8% 69.5% 66.5% 63.5% 60.4%
    - II 68.1% 68.6% 68.4% 70.9% 74.2%
    - III 68.0% 66.1% 68.0% 69.4% 68.4%
    - IV 53.0% 58.3% 59.5% 56.7% 56.8%
    - V 62.1% 65.5% 65.2% 63.1% 60.8%
    - VI 64.8% 66.4% 65.2% 64.8% 62.5%
    - VII 50.6% 54.7% 51.5% 54.2% 55.0%
    - VIII 57.1% 66.0% 62.7% 62.3% 61.0%
    - IX 49.2% 51.3% 45.8% 52.4% 49.5%
    - X 54.2% 56.1% 54.4% 54.2% 55.8%
    - XI 61.5% 59.4% 61.2% 60.9% 65.3%
    - XII 73.0% 74.0% 70.7% 74.7% 75.5%
    - Metropolitan 63.8% 67.8% 69.1% 67.1% 65.3%
Table 4
Coverage Index 1 (Contributors/Employment)
CASEN Surveys
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Variables
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
7.  Head of Household:
    -Head 63.1% 65.9% 66.3% 65.2% 64.7%
    -Non Head 58.3% 63.2% 61.8% 61.4% 59.5%
8.  Marriage Status:
    -Single 57.8% 63.4% 61.0% 61.6% 60.6%
    -Married, widow, divorced 62.1% 65.1% 65.3% 64.0% 62.7%
9. Occupation:
    -Defense and police 79.6% 86.1% 95.5% 97.7% 97.0%
    -Managers 50.2% 48.9% 52.1% 49.9% 41.8%
    -Professionals 84.7% 89.6% 86.2% 86.8% 85.5%
    -Technicians/medium level profess. 79.6% 81.6% 82.7% 83.2% 79.6%
    -White collar workers 84.1% 86.3% 89.6% 87.0% 86.2%
    -Sales and service workers 56.2% 59.9% 61.3% 61.8% 59.4%
    -Agricultural workers 37.0% 34.3% 31.4% 30.9% 38.6%
    -Blue collar workers 58.1% 59.0% 59.7% 55.4% 54.8%
    -Machine operators 69.5% 73.4% 72.8% 68.2% 68.2%
    -Non-skilled workers 52.7% 56.4% 54.0% 52.7% 53.2%
10.Economic Activity:
    -Agriculture 44.7% 47.6% 43.6% 43.7% 45.2%
    -Mining 79.1% 85.8% 83.8% 87.7% 86.7%
    -Manufacturing 69.4% 72.6% 74.4% 72.6% 70.8%
    -Electricity,gas and water 85.1% 83.6% 85.4% 85.4% 86.5%
    -Construction 64.7% 63.9% 65.3% 60.4% 58.1%
    -Trade 50.4% 54.8% 55.6% 55.4% 53.4%
    -Transport and Communications 59.8% 65.8% 62.3% 62.0% 59.1%
    -Financial Services 79.9% 84.8% 82.6% 81.2% 78.4%
    -Services 66.2% 69.5% 69.7% 68.6% 68.2%
11.Employment Category:
    -Employer 45.8% 50.1% 50.7% 49.6% 52.6%
    -Self-employed 19.4% 22.6% 21.1% 19.9% 17.4%
    -Wage Worker 76.9% 82.4% 79.7% 79.2% 78.2%
    -Domestic Service 50.1% 49.9% 46.5% 44.3% 44.3%
    -Family worker (without wage) 9.6% 10.9% 5.8% 6.6% 7.2%
12.Labor Contract:
    -Yes 91.9% 93.7% 93.7% 94.6% 94.0%
    -No 31.3% 26.3% 24.6% 21.9% 18.9%
13. Firm Size:
    -1-9 workers 39.0% 41.0% 44.2% 38.2% 37.0%
    -10-49 workers 77.5% 83.3% 81.7% 79.7% 78.2%
    -50-199 workers 85.2% 88.6% 87.2% 87.0% 85.8%
    -200 and + workers 89.2% 91.9% 92.7% 90.4% 90.7%
Table 4 (cont.)
Coverage Index 1 (Contributors/Employment)
CASEN Surveys
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Variables de caracterización:
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
14.Poverty:
    -Indigent 47.5% 45.0% 37.0% 29.8% 27.1%
    -Poor not indigent 58.0% 58.4% 56.2% 52.9% 48.3%
    -Non poor 62.2% 66.6% 66.0% 65.3% 64.7%
15.Decile of P.Capita Total Hous.Income:
    -Decile 1 43.6% 39.3% 38.3% 33.0% 26.6%
    -Decile 2 51.8% 51.4% 52.4% 48.4% 42.6%
    -Decile 3 55.2% 58.2% 56.7% 54.8% 50.7%
    -Decile 4 57.2% 58.4% 58.7% 59.2% 54.9%
    -Decile 5 57.9% 61.1% 63.4% 59.9% 55.4%
    -Decile 6 61.1% 62.0% 63.3% 63.2% 59.9%
    -Decile 7 60.4% 63.7% 65.4% 63.5% 63.5%
    -Decile 8 61.7% 67.4% 66.5% 66.8% 64.6%
    -Decile 9 64.9% 69.3% 68.2% 66.7% 67.8%
    -Decile 10 67.1% 71.6% 70.6% 71.2% 71.2%
16.Weekly hours of work:
    -0-20 hours 23.5% 29.9% 29.5% 26.0% 20.0%
    -21-30 hours 36.8% 42.0% 43.9% 38.2% 40.9%
    -31-39 hours 34.6% 40.5% 43.9% 54.5% 42.0%
    -40-48 hours 71.3% 73.3% 75.4% 75.7% 72.1%
    -49-60 hours 56.7% 61.6% 65.5% 65.8% 64.7%
    -61 and + hours 52.9% 55.2% 55.0% 55.4% 54.7%
17.Hourly wage by decile:
    -Decile 1 37.0% 25.9% 29.7% 39.1% 27.9%
    -Decile 2 57.7% 47.1% 60.3% 60.2% 53.6%
    -Decile 3 67.3% 60.5% 65.7% 68.0% 59.4%
    -Decile 4 60.6% 70.7% 65.2% 66.6% 70.3%
    -Decile 5 62.7% 68.7% 68.6% 68.2% 70.1%
    -Decile 6 68.3% 67.5% 70.3% 71.3% 65.3%
    -Decile 7 61.5% 69.3% 71.0% 65.9% 71.1%
    -Decile 8 67.4% 70.9% 70.6% 68.1% 71.6%
    -Decile 9 60.7% 72.8% 70.8% 66.8% 69.7%
    -Decile 10 64.8% 68.4% 65.1% 67.8% 68.7%
18.Type of employment:
    -Permanent 73.8% 71.9% 71.9% 70.4%
    -Temporary 35.5% 37.2% 35.0% 32.8%
    -Transitory ("a plazo fijo") 70.3% 72.3% 73.5% 66.7%
    -Transitory ("por tarea o servicio") 29.7% 26.9% 22.6% 21.8%
    -Other 23.6% 34.4% 22.4% 32.2%
19.Job seniority:
    -less than 1 year 54.7% 48.1%
    -1-3 years 69.8% 64.2%
    -3-5 years 72.1% 70.9%
    -5-10 years 71.3% 71.1%
    -10-15 years 66.5% 70.4%
    -more than 15 years 60.1% 61.9%
20.Type of shift:
    -Day 61.6%
    -Night 58.6%
    -Rotating shifts 79.0%
21.Health System: 
    -Indigent  22.3% 26.3% 23.5% 18.7% 6.5%
    -FONASA (public insurance) 78.4% 79.9% 78.8% 78.8% 80.1%
    -Isapre (private insurance) 88.0% 89.4% 88.5% 88.0% 88.8%
    -Particular (other private insurances) 22.0% 25.7% 21.4% 17.8% 5.3%
    -Other 60.9% 66.5% 70.7% 73.1% 72.2%
Source: computed using CASEN Household Survey Files.
Encuestas CASEN
Table 4 (cont.)





  14Household and marital status:  Heads of households have somewhat higher coverage 
relative to others, though the difference is only about five percentage points.  Those 
who have been ever married have somewhat higher coverage than those who have 
not, though again the difference is not very large. 
 
Occupation and sector of economic activity:  Defense force employees, professionals, 
technicians, midlevel professionals and white-collar workers have high coverage 
rates. In contrast, agricultural workers have the lowest coverage rates, with blue-
collar and non-skilled workers next lowest.  Among sectors of economic activity, 
agriculture has the lowest coverage levels (about 45%), with trade (50-55%) next.  
At the other extreme, mining, electricity, gas, water and financial services have the 
highest rates (all over 80%). 
 
Employment category: Non-remunerated family members (between 6 and 10%) and 
self-employed workers (about 20% stand out at the low end of the coverage 
distribution . Arenas de Mesa (2000) finds that approximately 4% of all independent 
workers pay into a pension fund (AFP). Even including INP covered workers, the 
percentage is significantly below the 20% that declare making contributions in the 
CASEN surveys. This contrast suggests that independent workers have alternative 
savings systems that they consider as pension contributions and that substitute for 
pension contributions or that, alternatively, the workers surveyed could be using a 
different time frame (e.g., they could be referring to contributions made in the 
preceding year in the CASEN, while Arenas de Mesa  is referring to monthly data).  
The analysis by employment category also highlights the low coverage levels among 
domestic service workers and employers with rates below or approaching 50%.  At 
the other end of the distribution, wage workers have the highest coverage rates 
(around 80%). 
 
Labor contract status: Over 90% of wage workers with contracts make pension 
contributions, but only 20% of those without contracts. Therefore, there is 
correlation between these two indicators of employment formality. 
 
Firm size: Average coverage rates increase monotonically with the number of 
workers in a firm, particularly with movement from below ten to more than ten 
workers. Coverage rates are about half as large for firms with less than ten workers 
(and less than 45%) than for firms with 10-49 workers (around 80%). In contrast, 
the rate for mid-sized companies with 50-199 workers is greater than 85% and is 
about 90% for large companies with 200+ workers. 
 
Poverty, income, wage rate and hours worked distributions:  Coverage is positively 
related to household per capita income.  Moreover, over the time period covered, the 
dispersion of coverage with income increased. Coverage rates dropped in the lower 
deciles, particularly sharply for those categorized as indigenet (from 47.5% in 1992 
to 27.1% in 2000) but also for those categorized as poor but not indigent (from 
58.0% to 48.3%). In contrast, coverage for the nonpoor increased from 62.2% in 
1992 to a peak of 66.0% in 1996 and then declined slightly to 64.7% in 2000.  
Similar patterns, but with less sharp differences, are observed for the wage rate 
distribution.  The patterns are less sharp in part because the coverage rates are not, 
monotonic with respect to hours worked per week, but are substantially higher (over 
70%) for those who work 40-48 hours than for those who work more (which may be 
reflecting the selection of poorly qualified workers in this group) or (particularly) 
those who work less (part-time workers).  In addition there is the important 
distinction between individual wages and household income, with coverage 
  15apparently lower in households who are relatively low in the per capita income 
distribution because they have relatively few workers.  
 
Type of employment contract and seniority: Workers with temporary contracts, or 
contracts for specific tasks have very low coverage rate (less than half the coverage 
of workers with permanent contracts). On the other hand, workers with fixed-term 
contracts have surprisingly high coverage levels, as well as those who do shift work.  
Coverage also increases initially with seniority, though it peaks on average with only 
3-5 years of seniority.   
 
Health coverage:  Only about 20% of those who declare themselves indigent for the 
purposes of the health system contribute to the pension system, and there is a 
sharply decling tendency from the peak of 26.3% in 1994 to 6.5% in 2000. The 
pattern is similar for those who declare having private health plans. However, about 
80% of those who declare belonging to FONASA (The National Health Fund) and over 
88% of those who contribute to ISAPRE (Private Health Funds) also make pension 
contributions. While these rates are high, it still is possible to have a health plan and 
to not contribute to any pension system. 
 
To sum up, the information presented in this section provides a broader 
characterization of individuals in Chile with and without pension system coverage 
when the definition based on making contributions is used. However, this 
characterization is limited because it is based on bivariate tabulations. The next 
section turns to multivariate analysis. 
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3.3. Regressions for the probability of making social security contributions 
using repeated cross-section CASEN surveys for 1992-2000 
 
This section considers the factors associated with making contributions to the 
pension system (based on the self-reporting in the household surveys) for the sub-
sample of workers. This multivariate analysis distinguishes between two states: 
contributor and non-contributor.  This analysis permits establishing whether the 
correlations detected earlier hold once the complete vector of right-side variables is 
considered. Probit models with hetero-skedasticity corrections have been used to 
estimate the probability of contributing under different specifications for this 
analysis. . Table 5 gives the estimates for basically the identical specification (except 
some of the contractual variables are not available for 1992) for the 1992, 1994, 
1996, 1998 and 2000 CASEN surveys. The right-side varaiables are those that are 
discussed for the bivariate relations in the Section 3.2. 
 
Gender: Once there are multivariate controls, men are more likely to make 
contributions than women, in contrast with the results in Barrientos (1998). In the 
period under analysis, men have between 5 and 9 additional points of probability of 
making contributions than do women. This is greater than the 1-2% gap in the 
bivariate estimates in Table 4. Therefore, the failure to control for other 
characteristics leads to higher pension coverage associations for women relative to 
men, but this difference is not robust fact if other characteristics are includedof men. 
 
Age: A statistically significant concave relationship between age and the probability 
of making pension contributions is observed, which tends to become stronger over 
the period considered. Thus, for example, initially for every additional year of age, 
the probability of contributing increases between 1 and 2 percentage points, but this 
probability decreases rapidly so, at around 45 years, the correlation disappears, 
which is consistent with what appears in the simple tabulations of the previous 
section. The important point is that this correlation holds even when considering 
individuals with the same education and with control for the rest of the variables 
included in Table 5. 
 
Schooling attainment:  The positive relationship between schooling attainment and 
the probability of making pension contributions in the bivariate analysis tends to 
persist in the multivariate analysis even though this relation varies somewhat across 
the years. On average, a completed secondary education or a completed higher 
education is associated with an 0.05 higher probability of making contributions. This 
suggests that increases in the average schooling of the labor force will lead to, 
ceteris paribus, increases in pension coverage. 
 
Geographical residence:  There is a general advantage of some 4 to 5 points of 
probability when living in an urban zone that holds for virtually all the years 
analyzed. This is much smaller than appears in the bivariate associations in Table 4 
because in the bivariate associations the rural-urban variable in part is proxying for 
other characteristics, such as schooling attainment, type of employment contract, 
firm size, and type of economic activity. There are also regional effects relative to 
the Santiago metropolitan region (the omitted region in the specification). These 
regional effects vary from year to year, but their inclusion cleans the effects of the 
other explanatory variables from possible regional associations. 
  17Variable 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Gender:
Men=1 0.0654 * 0.0457 * 0.0478 * 0.0786 * 0.0869 *
Age:
Age 0.0126 * 0.0110 * 0.0119 * 0.0215 * 0.0253 *
Age squared -0.0001 * -0.0001 * -0.0001 * -0.0002 * -0.0003 *
Schooling attainment:
Complete Primary Schooling=1 0.0088 0.0286 * 0.0123 -0.0137 0.0270 *
Incomplete Second.Schooling=1 0.0187 ** 0.0302 * 0.0056 0.0100 0.0129
Complete Second.Schooling=1 0.0560 * 0.0625 * 0.0486 * 0.0460 * 0.0685 *
Incomplete Higher Education=1 0.0191 0.0054 0.0030 0.0444 * 0.0559 *
Complete Higher Education=1 0.0622 * 0.0919 * 0.0246 0.0541 * 0.0377 **
Geographical residence:
Region 1=1 0.0669 * 0.0318 ** 0.0241 0.0641 * 0.0051
Region 2=1 0.0546 * 0.0213 -0.0026 0.0297 0.0816 *
Region 3=1 0.0578 * -0.0217 0.0683 * 0.0860 * 0.0126
Region 4=1 0.0183 0.0038 0.0287 ** 0.0181 0.0571 *
Region 5=1 0.0291 ** 0.0229 ** 0.0022 0.0437 * 0.0225
Region 6=1 0.0723 * 0.0443 * 0.0758 * 0.0708 * 0.0464 *
Region 7=1 0.0548 * -0.0048 0.0059 0.0605 * 0.0316 *
Region 8=1 0.0434 * 0.0583 * 0.0339 * 0.0170 0.0071
Region 9=1 0.0656 * -0.0549 * -0.0218 0.0275 ** 0.0011
Region 10=1 0.0598 * -0.0135 -0.0494 * 0.0379 * 0.0544 *
Region 11=1 0.0932 * -0.0012 0.0376 * 0.0242 0.1162 *
Region 12=1 0.1066 * 0.0697 * 0.0955 * 0.1593 * 0.1162 *
Urban Zone=1 0.0526 * 0.0117 0.0544 * 0.0406 * 0.0331 *
Household head and marital status:
Head of Household=1 0.0796 * 0.0403 * 0.0639 * 0.0413 * 0.0814 *
Single=1 0.0355 * 0.0151 0.0345 * 0.0227 * 0.0468 *
Sector of economic activity:
Mining=1 0.0110 0.0083 -0.0042 0.0011 -0.0319
Manufacturing=1 0.0206 -0.0001 0.0252 0.0166 -0.0079
Electricity,gas,water=1 0.0238 -0.0484 -0.0512 -0.0186 -0.0942
Construction=1 0.0565 * 0.0643 * 0.0388 * 0.0509 * 0.0277
Trade=1 0.0726 * 0.0322 * 0.0221 0.0663 * -0.0247 **
Transportation=1 0.0042 -0.0213 0.0044 -0.0102 -0.0785 *
Financial Services=1 0.0911 * 0.0635 * 0.0576 * 0.0711 * 0.0070
Services=1 0.0181 -0.0100 -0.0085 0.0060 0.0709 *
Firm Size:
Firm Size 10-49 workers=1 0.1133 * 0.0837 * 0.0662 * 0.1077 * 0.0750 *
Firm Size 50-199 workers=1 0.1380 * 0.1279 * 0.0901 * 0.1252 * 0.1409 *
Firm Size 200 and + workers=1 0.1999 * 0.1643 * 0.1326 * 0.1679 * 0.2253 *
Poverty:
Indigent=1 -0.0520 * -0.0287 ** -0.0604 * -0.0747 * -0.0780 *
Poor non-indigent=1 -0.0447 * -0.0070 -0.0368 * -0.0397 * -0.0230 **
Type of empl.contract & type of worker:
Permanent Contract=1 0.0640 * 0.1209 * 0.1337 * 0.1551 *
Temporary Contract (Plazo)=1 -0.0200 -0.0121 0.0131 0.0077
Temporary Contract (Obra)=1 -0.0736 * -0.0109 -0.0280 -0.0348
It has signed contract=1 0.4960 * 0.4776 * 0.5624 * 0.5298 * 0.5246 *
Employer=1 0.0170 0.0177 0.0845 * 0.0673 * 0.0895 *
Self-employed=1 -0.1130 * -0.0620 * -0.0448 * -0.0736 * -0.0753 *
Domestic Service=1 -0.0329 ** -0.0292 -0.0940 * -0.0824 * -0.1478 *
Family worker=1 -0.1999 ** -0.2965 * -0.2709 * -0.2549 * -0.2193 *
Health insurance coverage:
No health insurance=1 -0.0393 * -0.0534 * 0.0213 -0.0249 * -0.0169 *
Fonasa=1 (Public Health Insurance) 0.3081 * 0.2370 * 0.3040 * 0.2991 * 0.0429 *
Isapre=1 (Private Health Insurance) 0.2841 * 0.2297 * 0.2857 * 0.2590 * 0.3464 *
Number of observations 44955 57827 45173 64251 80734
Pseudo-R
2
0.5268 0.5136 0.5525 0.5664 0.6283
Notes:a)Estimation Method: Probit with heteroskedasticity corrections; 
          b)Coefficients indicate the change in the probability as a consequence of a partial change in the
             explanatory variables (evaluated at mean values).
          * Significant at 5%; **Significant at 10%
Table 5
Regressions for the probability of making social security contributions
(Dummy Dependent Variable=1 if individual is contributing and 0 otherwise)
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Household head and marital status: The head of household has a probability of 
making contributions that is between 4 and 8 percentage points higher than 
nonheads, which is a little greater than appears in the bivariate associations in table 
4. Being married, however, in the multivariate estimates is associated with a 
reduction of between 2 and 5 percentages points in being covered – the opposite of 
what is suggested by the bivariate estimates.  Thus in the bivariate estimates marital 
status apparently is proxying in part for other characteristics associated with 
coverage.  , while a permanent contract offers a strong positive relation with that 
probability. 
 
Sector of economic activity:  The economic activity controls (relative to the 
agricultural sector that is excluded from the equation) appear less significant in the 
multivariate than in the bivariate estimates. For example, once other variables are 
simultaneously controlled, neither the mining nor the community services sectors 
have higher coverage rates, as was suggested in Table 4. 
 
Firm size:  The firm size is positively associated with coverage probabilities in the 
multivariate estimates as in the bivariate estimates.  But the association is less 
strong, suggesting that in the bivariate associations in part firm size is proxying for 
other characteristics such as schooling attainment and type of labor contract. 
 
Poverty: With multivariate controls, the probability of making contributions falls by 
between 3 and 7 percentage points for being  indigent and by between 0 and 4 
percentage points for being poor but not indigent.  These are smaller amounts than 
indicated in the bivariate associations because the correlations between relative 
income and other important factors, such as the type of labor contract.  
 
Type of employment contract and type of worker: The greatest association with 
converage in the multivariate estimates is indubitably having an employment 
contract, which, all else constant, increases the probability of making contributions 
by around 50 points. Therefore, the strong correlation observed in the bivariate 
tabulations in Table 4 is, if anything, stronger once there are multivariate controls.  
There is a further positive association of 6-15 percentage points with the contract 
being permanent, but – in contrast to the bivariate results – there no longer is a 
significant association with a fixed time contract.  Once there are the other controls 
(including importantly the types of contracts), the association is much smaller, 
though still negative, with being a family worker, self-employed or in domestic 
service (relative to the excluded category of being a wage worker). 
 
Health insurance coverage:  Not having health insurance (or being classified as 
indigent for those effects) is generally associated with lower probabilities of making 
contributions. In contrast, being covered by FONASA (The Public Health System) or 
an ISAPRE (The Private Health System) have strong positive correlations with the 
probability of making contributions.  The multivariate associations, however, once 
again are somewhat smaller than the bivariate ones in table 4, suggesting once 
again that in part health insurance coverage in the bivariate estimates is proxying for 
other factors such as employment contracts. 
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4. Characterization of and analysis of the determinants of the density of 
social security contributions and its dynamics 
 
In this section, we broaden our view to cover the density of contributions.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, determining whether an individual contributed or 
not to the pension system in a given month does not provide us with a complete 
view of his/her coverage situation. The percentage of months in which an individual 
has made social security contributions as an adult, herein referred to as density of 
contributions, better represents his/her coverage as it pertains to the probability of 
obtaining pension benefits.  However prior analysis has focused only on current 
contributions, not the cumulative density of contributions. 
 
When attempting to estimate the density of contributions in the Chilean pension 
system, the usual problem is the lack of individual level information. However, by 
incorporating new information from the Employment History and Social Security 




4.1. The Labor History and Social Security Survey (HLSS) 
 
In 2002, the Micro-data Center of the Department of Economics of the Universidad 
de Chile, conducted a new household survey (2002 HLSS, Historia Laboral y 
Seguridad Social) that provides useful information for addressing the main issue of 
this paper. The 2002 survey, financed by the Secretary of Labor and Social Security, 
contains information on 17,246 individuals affiliated to the retirement system at any 
time during the 1981-2001 time span
3. Survey information collected includes socio-
demographic data and current labor market data for each member of the household, 
detailed information about receipt of pensions and types of pension plan participation 
and retrospective labor market history going back to 1980.  
 
The sampling frame of the 2002 HLSS survey consists of all individuals enrolled in 
the social security system for at least one month during the 1981-2001 time period. 
The sample included individuals who in 2002 were working, unemployed, out of the 
labor force, receiving pensions, or deceased (in this case the information was 
collected from surviving relatives).  The sample was drawn from a sampling frame of 
approximately 8.1 million current and former affiliates of the social security system 
that was compiled from official databases (obtained from the Secretary of Labor and 
Social Security). This sample covers around 75% of the population aged 15 and older 
in 2001.  The HLSS survey was applied between April and December of 2002.  
 
The 2002 HLSS data contains rich information on household characteristics, 
earnings, labor force participation, assets, pension plan participation and savings. 
Particularly relevant for our purposes is the collection of retrospective data going 
back to 1980 on all employment, non-employment and unemployment spells. The 
2002 HLSS questionnaire also contains some questions that are designed to directly 
elicit information about respondent's risk aversion.  
                                                 
3 Information on the methodology and extent of the survey can be found in Bravo (2004). 
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4.2. Estimating and characterizing the density of contributions 
 
In this section we characterize the dynamics of Social Security contributions over 20 
years of experience.  As already stated, the interviewees provided information on 
their employment and social security contribution situation dating back to January 
1980. The density of contribution indicators were calculated by adding the number of 
months since January 1980 in which the interviewees declared having made pension 
system contributions and then dividing that by the number of months in which 
individuals were older than 15 since January 1980.   Table 6 shows the distribution of 

























Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Distribution of the Density of Contributions




























Table 6 shows that on average the affiliates surveyed reported having made pension 
system contributions in 52% of months. The average density registered is 
significantly lower than what is usually used in pension simulation and projection 
exercises for representative individuals, which usually is 80% or more. Table 6 shows 
that only around 30% of affiliates reported having or surpassing that density of 
contributions. 
 
However, the low average density of contributions is not the only noteworthy aspect 
observable in Table 6. The form of the distribution of this parameter in the 
population is also notable. To observe this more clearly, figure 1 contains a non-
parametric graph of the distribution of the density of contributions according to the 
self-reporting of the interviewees. 
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This distribution is clearly bimodal: part of the population (approximately 15%) has a 
density of contributions approaching 0, while another significant group 
(approximately 15%) has a contribution density approaching 100%. 
 
To delve further into the characteristics associated with the general profile of the 
density of contributions, Table 7 has information on the average density as well as 
on another three points of the distribution (percentiles 25, 50 and 75) for different 
socio-demographic variables.  The information in Table 7 is complemented by the 
decomposition of the density of contributions indicator in Table 8. In effect, if the 
density of contributions of an individual i is defined as the number of months with 
contributions (ci) as a percentage of the total number of months in which individual i 
was 15 years old or older (mi):  
 








then, the density may be written as the product of the pension coverage of individual 
i in the months worked (ci/li) and the percentage of months in the adult working 
history in which individual i was working (li/mi). 
 
Current work and pension status: The average density of contributions over the last 
20 years for affiliates with a pension but who continue working (64%) is higher than 
that of those working who do not yet receive a pension (53%). On the other hand, 
pensioners who have pulled out of the labor market have a lower density (41%).
4  
That pensioners who are outside the labor market have a lower density is related to 
their leaving the labor market (as may be observed in Table 8): they have a much 
lower employment rate than the other categories, even though their contribution 
rate to the pension system was very high when they were working (possibly because 
their work was right before their retirement). 
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4  It should be noted that in Chile, it is not necessary to quit working to receive a pension. In such a 




Variable Mean 25% 50% 75%
1. Total 52.4% 19.8% 54.2% 85.2%
2. Current Status:
    -Active (not retired) 53.3% 22.2% 54.8% 85.4%
    -With pension and in the labor force 64.2% 35.6% 74.5% 100.0%
    -Retired only with pension 41.4% 0.0% 40.5% 76.3%
3. Sex:
    -Men 59.8% 31.5% 65.7% 92.7%
    -Women 43.8% 11.3% 40.2% 72.3%
4. Age:
    -15-18 years 19.2% 5.6% 12.5% 25.7%
    -19-24 years  35.2% 12.5% 31.1% 52.8%
    -25-34 years 47.0% 23.6% 47.7% 68.8%
    -35-44 years 56.0% 27.8% 60.7% 84.2%
    -45-54 years 66.8% 33.5% 83.7% 100.0%
    -55-64 years 63.4% 28.3% 77.9% 100.0%
    -65 and older 38.7% 0.0% 31.1% 75.6%
5. Schooling:
    -None 31.3% 0.0% 9.3% 61.5%
    -Primary Incomplete 47.6% 4.4% 46.7% 89.2%
    -Primary Complete 52.2% 17.2% 53.7% 87.5%
    -Secondary Incomplete 54.7% 22.1% 57.8% 87.8%
    -Secondary Complete 55.7% 28.9% 58.8% 82.7%
    -Vocational Higher Education 52.3% 28.1% 53.2% 75.9%
    -University Incomplete 44.8% 13.3% 43.1% 71.8%
    -University Complete 63.8% 37.0% 68.1% 99.3%
Percentile
Table 7
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Variable Mean 25% 50% 75%
6. Head of Household:
    -Head 59.5% 29.2% 66.4% 94.8%
    -Non Head 43.1% 13.3% 39.7% 68.8%
7. Marriage Status:
    -Single 45.2% 16.1% 43.3% 69.7%
    -Married, widow, divorced 54.7% 21.8% 58.2% 89.3%
8. Current Occupational Status:
    -Employed 61.2% 35.3% 65.5% 94.1%
    -Unemployed 45.7% 17.4% 43.3% 72.7%
    -Out of the Labor Force 33.7% 0.7% 23.5% 59.8%
9. Per Capita Total Household Income:
    -Quintile 1 (lower) 42.7% 8.8% 36.7% 75.2%
    -Quintile 2  46.7% 12.7% 45.2% 78.8%
    -Quintile 3 52.6% 20.5% 55.0% 85.0%
    -Quintile 4 56.8% 28.5% 60.0% 89.0%
    -Quintile 5 (higher) 60.8% 34.8% 65.5% 95.6%
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Density of Contributions: Characterization
Percentile



























Gender:  Table 7 shows that the average density of contributions of men is 16 
percentage points higher than that of women. This difference exists in all points of 
the distribution. Thus, for example, if individuals were ordered by density of 
contributions, men from percentile 10 have a density of 32% compared with the 
same percentile for women that reaches an 11% density. Table 8 shows that the 
lower density for women is attributed to the lower employment rate of women in the 
reference period. In contrast, in periods when men and women both declare working, 
women have higher contribution rates than men. 
 
Age: in contrast to the age patterns in Table 4 with the highest values for young 
workers, Table 7 shows that the density of contributions, for the average and for the 
different percentiles, follows a monotonic pattern until approximately 60 years of 
age, when people start to receive their pensions
5. For the 65 and over group, which 
covers most pensioners, contribution densities are lower. This could be due in part to 
the fact that, as was mentioned earlier, pensioners do not have to make 
contributions to the pension system. Table 8 provides complementary information, 
indicating that the increasing density rate is (at least until 54 years old), at least 
partially, due to the increasing employment rate. 
                                                 
5 Even though the legal pension age is 60 for women and 65 for men, it is possible to obtain a pension 
earlier in the AFP system once certain criteria are fulfilled: (a) Getting a pension equal to or above 110% 
of the minimum pension guaranteed by the State; and (b) the pension is equal to or above 50% of the 
average of the taxable income of the last 10 years of work (inflation adjusted). 
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Variable
1. Total 52.4% 84.4% 64.6%
2. Current Status:
    -Active (not retired) 53.3% 83.7% 66.7%
    -With pension and in the labor force 64.2% 74.6% 87.7%
    -Retired only with pension 41.4% 97.2% 40.5%
3. Sex:
    -Men 59.8% 80.8% 76.1%
    -Women 43.8% 89.0% 51.2%
4. Age:
    -15-18 years 19.2% 80.2% 28.4%
    -19-24 years  35.2% 82.0% 44.0%
    -25-34 years 47.0% 84.6% 57.8%
    -35-44 years 56.0% 83.9% 71.0%
    -45-54 years 66.8% 87.5% 82.1%
    -55-64 years 63.4% 81.2% 77.1%
    -65 and older 38.7% 85.3% 45.2%
5. Schooling:
    -None 31.3% 71.2% 44.2%
    -Primary Incomplete 47.6% 79.0% 63.0%
    -Primary Complete 52.2% 77.3% 70.3%
    -Secondary Incomplete 54.7% 79.8% 68.9%
    -Secondary Complete 55.7% 91.0% 65.4%
    -Vocational Higher Education 52.3% 89.8% 59.8%
    -University Incomplete 44.8% 80.6% 56.5%
    -University Complete 63.8% 91.7% 70.0%
6. Head of Household:
    -Head 59.5% 83.2% 74.1%
    -Non Head 43.1% 86.0% 52.2%
7. Marriage Status:
    -Single 45.2% 81.5% 57.0%
    -Married, widow, divorced 54.7% 85.3% 67.0%
8. Per Capita Total Household Income:
    -Quintile 1 (lower) 42.7% 76.8% 58.1%
    -Quintile 2  46.7% 77.6% 61.5%
    -Quintile 3 52.6% 85.6% 64.0%
    -Quintile 4 56.8% 92.1% 67.6%
    -Quintile 5 (higher) 60.8% 87.6% 70.4%
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Table 8
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Schooling attainment: The density of contributions of affiliates with secondary 
education is higher than that of those with only primary education, and they are in 
turn above those without any education. In line with this pattern, affiliates with full 
university education have the highest density of contributions. However, this 
tendency for higher density with more schooling is broken by higher vocational 
education and incomplete university studies: in these cases, the density of 
contributions is similar to that of affiliates with only primary education (both on 
average and for the percentiles shown).  
 
Household head and marital status: The densities of contributions for heads of 
households are significantly higher than that of other members of the household. 
This is consistent with what may be observed in Tables 4 and 5 when using a simpler 
coverage indicator. This basically reflects the much higher employment rate of the 
heads of households (Table 8).  Those married have higher density than those not.  
This differential contrasts with the relatively lower and more unstable one shown in 
Tables 4 and 5 when using the proportion of contributors. Once again, the most 
relevant element for explaining the difference between these two groups is the 
higher employment rate of married individuals. 
 
Employment status at time of survey:  The average density for those employed 
exceeds 60%, while the level for those unemployed was 15 points lower and 27 point 
lower for those who at the time of the survey were out of the labor force. 
 
Income distribution: The lowest densities of contribution are concentrated in 
individuals who live in the lowest income households. In fact, if households are 
ranked by the total per capita income reported in the survey, the median of the 
density is 37% for the lowest income quintile and 66% for the highest quintile. This 
pattern is analogous to that shown by the coverage indicator of Table 4: the poorest 
households not only have a lower probability of making contributions at any given 
point in time, but they are also associated with lower accumulated contributions. 
 
Table 9 shows the contribution densities of the individuals surveyed, separated by 
social security systems: AFP and INP (the affiliates who opted to stay in the old 
pension system). 
 
In general, the densities shown by affiliates of the AFP system are higher than those 
of the current affiliates of the INP system. This becomes even more marked when 
comparing the densities by age group or by status, which allows us to better isolate 
the heterogeneity of those sub-samples. It should be kept in mind however, that 
causal effects of the AFP system cannot be deduced from this Table, since there may 
be a selection bias in the transfer process from the old system
6. 
 
Table 10 reports the density of contributions for different characteristics only of the 
workers who declared being actively employed in the survey. The characteristics 
refer only to the last job reported, but are more reflective of the longer-run work 
history if there is serial correlation in such characteristics over the life cycle (e.g., 
due to state dependence). 
                                                 
6 For example, these figures could be showing that those who opted to switch to the AFP system were 
individuals with higher densities of contribution. 
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Variable Mean 25% 50% 75%
1. Total 52.4% 19.8% 54.2% 85.2%
2. AFP System: 56.0% 27.8% 57.9% 86.1%
    2.1. By Age:
    -15-18 years 19.8% 8.3% 16.7% 25.7%
    -19-24 years  35.7% 13.1% 31.7% 53.3%
    -25-34 years 47.4% 24.4% 47.9% 69.0%
    -35-44 years 57.2% 30.0% 62.2% 84.8%
    -45-54 years 70.2% 43.6% 86.7% 100.0%
    -55-64 years 71.1% 48.4% 84.4% 100.0%
    -65 and older 61.2% 40.4% 64.1% 88.9%
    2.2 By Status:
    -Active (not retired) 55.0% 26.4% 56.3% 85.1%
    -With pension and in the labor force 70.8% 50.2% 81.9% 100.0%
    -Retired only with pension 61.1% 44.8% 65.8% 83.2%
3. INP (Old pension system): 40.5% 0.0% 28.8% 84.1%
    3.1. By Age:
    -35-44 years 36.0% 0.0% 25.5% 67.0%
    -45-54 years 52.2% 4.5% 57.6% 100.0%
    -55-64 years 52.0% 0.0% 54.3% 98.5%
    -65 and older 33.2% 0.0% 13.8% 66.7%
    3.2 By Status:
    -Active (not retired) 44.9% 0.0% 32.5% 100.0%
    -With pension and in the labor force 53.2% 8.8% 55.2% 99.3%
    -Retired only with pension 34.3% 0.0% 21.4% 68.6%
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Table 9






































Current employment category, occupation and economic activity: The low densities 
of contribution of non-remunerated and independent workers stand out (and to a 
lesser extent, domestic service workers), in comparison with employers and wage 
workers. Likewise, the low density is more evident among unskilled workers, 
salespeople, agricultural and service workers among occupations and among those 
who were working at the time of the survey in the agricultural and retail sectors with 
regard to economic activity. 
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Variable Mean 25% 50% 75%
1. Total 61.2% 35.3% 65.5% 94.1%
2. Current Employment Category:
    -Employer 60.8% 26.3% 68.1% 100.0%
    -Self-employed 45.1% 8.9% 42.1% 78.4%
    -Wage Worker 65.8% 43.9% 69.3% 95.9%
    -Domestic Service 52.2% 19.6% 52.6% 89.0%
    -Family worker (without wage) 35.3% 11.8% 22.7% 61.9%
3. Current Occupation:
    -Managers 58.8% 26.1% 61.3% 100.0%
    -Professionals 65.3% 40.3% 68.8% 100.0%
    -Technicians/medium level profess. 60.4% 38.4% 63.2% 85.0%
    -White collar workers 64.8% 43.3% 68.3% 91.5%
    -Sales and service workers 55.0% 26.8% 55.9% 83.6%
    -Agricultural workers 53.2% 13.3% 56.4% 94.4%
    -Blue collar workers 64.0% 41.2% 70.0% 95.5%
    -Machine operators 68.8% 48.1% 74.9% 98.5%
    -Non-skilled workers 58.4% 28.0% 60.6% 94.4%
4. Current Economic Activity:
    -Agriculture 58.1% 22.1% 64.1% 98.2%
    -Mining 74.0% 57.0% 78.6% 100.0%
    -Manufacturing 67.0% 46.8% 72.0% 95.8%
    -Electricity,gas and water 74.0% 50.9% 84.4% 100.0%
    -Construction 64.0% 39.5% 69.4% 95.1%
    -Trade 55.4% 28.1% 57.8% 84.8%
    -Transport and Communications 61.9% 38.6% 67.0% 91.5%
    -Financial Services 60.8% 38.2% 63.6% 87.5%
    -Services 61.2% 33.3% 64.8% 99.1%
Table 10
Density of Contributions for currently employed
Percentile





Variable Mean 25% 50% 75%
5. Labor Contract in Current Employment:
    -Yes 69.4% 49.0% 73.1% 99.2%
    -No 42.9% 11.9% 40.1% 69.5%
6. Firm Size in current employment:
    -1 worker 47.3% 11.9% 44.4% 81.5%
    -2-9 workers 56.7% 26.6% 58.8% 91.5%
    -10-19 workers 65.7% 43.8% 69.8% 96.3%
    -20-49 workers 66.8% 46.9% 69.7% 96.7%
    -50-99 workers 67.6% 46.7% 72.4% 99.3%
    -100-199 workers 67.8% 46.8% 72.1% 95.2%
    -200-499 workers 68.8% 46.8% 72.9% 97.4%
    -500 and + workers 68.1% 48.1% 71.8% 99.3%
7. Weekly hours of work in current empl.:
    -0-20 hours 39.5% 8.9% 33.3% 64.9%
    -21-30 hours 50.7% 18.5% 47.8% 86.4%
    -31-39 hours 54.4% 23.4% 52.0% 90.7%
    -40-48 hours 66.0% 44.4% 69.7% 97.0%
    -49-60 hours 61.0% 35.0% 66.3% 95.2%
    -61 and + hours 62.4% 35.3% 68.9% 97.9%
8. Hourly wage by quintile in current empl.:
    -Quintile 1 (lower) 50.6% 17.4% 50.0% 85.6%
    -Quintile 2 61.5% 36.7% 64.4% 93.3%
    -Quintile 3 63.4% 41.0% 67.4% 93.1%
    -Quintile 4 65.4% 44.6% 70.2% 94.5%
    -Quintile 5 (higher) 68.5% 47.0% 73.1% 100.0%
9. Type of current employment:
    -Permanent 63.4% 38.8% 68.2% 96.3%
    -Temporary 52.0% 19.9% 54.4% 83.8%
    -Transitory ("a plazo fijo") 55.9% 30.0% 57.6% 82.6%
    -Transitory ("por tarea o servicio") 49.7% 18.9% 48.5% 79.8%
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.









































Labor contracts: Employees currently working with contracts also have the highest 
densities of contributions.  
 
Firm size: Workers in companies with less than 10 employees have the lowest 
densities; workers in larger companies have densities of contributions that are 
relatively similar among each other. 
 
Weekly hours of work: In concordance with the coverage indicators of Table 4, the 
highest densities of contributions increase with the extension of the working week up 
to 48 hours, after which they fall off for longer working hours.  
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Type of employment contract: Employees in jobs they themselves consider 
permanent have higher densities of contributions than those with temporary 
positions.  
 
Wage rates:  Those with higher wage rates in their current employment also have 
higher densities of contributions.  The sharpest gradient, as above, is between the 
bottom and the next lowest part (quintile in this case) of the distribution. 
 
Table 11 links the concept of coverage used in the section 3 with that of density of 
contributions from this section. Currently employed workers that made social 
security contributions in the previous month have a higher average density of 
contributions (70%) than those who did not contribute (38%), thus, illustrating 
again the serial correlation over time in contributions. Nevertheless, it should also be 
noted that 25% of the workers who did not make contributions in the preceding 
month in fact have a density of contributions above 64%. Analogously, 25% of those 
that report having made contributions in the preceding month have densities of 
contributions below 50% in the last 20 years. 
 
 
Mean 25% 50% 75%
Total of currently employed workers: 61.2% 35.3% 65.5% 94.1%
 -without social security contributions
  during last month 38.0% 6.9% 31.1% 64.0%
 -with social security contributions
  during last month 70.1% 50.0% 74.1% 100.0%
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Table 11

















Using the self-reporting of the employment history for the last 20 years, it is possible 
to analyze all the periods of the different individuals surveyed, in which they declared 
working in different employment categories. 
 
Table 12 illustrates mobility among employment categories over time.  It shows, for 
example,  that among the workers that worked as salaried workers in some month, 
17% also worked as self-employed (at least one month in their employment history 
of the last 20 years), 2.8% as employers, 5.7% as domestic workers and less than 
1% as non-remunerated family members.  Among those who reported having had at 
least one month as independent workers, 74% also worked as salaried workers. Only 
23% reported having worked only as self-employed workers since 1980.  
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Considering the total
who worked at least 1
month in each category: WW SE EM DS FW
Wage-worker (WW) 100% 17.2% 2.8% 5.7% 0.8%
Self/employed (SE) 74.3% 100% 2.4% 4.5% 0.9%
Employer (EM) 61.4% 12.5% 100% 1.3% 0.8%
Domestic Service (DS) 48.5% 8.9% 0.5% 100.0% 0.3%
Non-remunerated 87.0% 22.6% 4.0% 4.1% 100.0%
family worker (FW)
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Other categories where they have worked:
Table 12




















Table 13 compares the density of contributions for the different employment 
categories by using the information from the self-reported employment history of 
those surveyed. This Table was built by computing the density of contributions for 
each individual for each employment category in which they may have worked (as is 
shown in Table 12, the interviewees, in fact, report being in several categories at a 





Percentile Wage Self- Employer Domestic  
Worker Employed Service
Mean 87.6% 23.9% 51.3% 62.4%
Percentile:
5% 15.7% 0% 0% 0%
10% 48.1% 0% 0% 0%
25% 92.2% 0% 0% 0%
50% 100% 0% 75.8% 100%
75% 100% 25.5% 100% 100%
90% 100% 100% 100% 100%
95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NºObservations 13422 3185 574 1533
Source: Elaborated using HLSS Survey.
Density of contributions in months worked as:
Table 13
Density of contributions in months worked






















  31Table 13 confirms the importance of the employment category in the probability of 
making contributions into the pension system. When only the months in the salaried 
category for each individual are considered, the distribution is heavily biased, with an 
average density of contributions of 88%. In fact, it may be observed that 75% of 
individuals report having densities of over 92%.  The opposite applies for those 
months worked in the self-employment category. In this case, 50% of individuals 
registered a density of 0 and 75% have densities below 25%. Nevertheless, 10% 
declared having made contributions all the months in which they worked 
independently. 
 
In the case of the months in which individuals were employers or worked as 
domestic help, the densities show an intermediate situation with markedly bimodal 
distributions: with regard to employers, while 25% of individuals did not make 
contributions, another equivalent percentage had a density of 100%; lastly, 50% of 
domestic help workers indicated they had a density of 100% even though 25% 
stated they had not made any contributions. 
 
The survey also allows the evaluation of the importance of sub declaration of 
contributions. Out of the total months in which individuals worked as salaried 
employees and made contributions, 85% of these contributions were for the total of 
the remuneration. Of the other 15%, the contribution for most months took the 
minimum wage as the base.  The sub declaration rate approaches 40% in the case of 
periods worked in the employer category, while for periods worked as independent 
workers, Figure 2 suggest that when social security contributions are made, 
approximately 55% do so for a remuneration below the amount actually earned 











































To complete the characterization of the density of contributions, Table 14 presents a 
set of multivariate regression with density of contributions as the dependent 
variable, based on the data in the Employment History and Social Security Survey.  
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The alternative specifications start with a small set of variables and then sequentially 
add other groups of variables.  First we consider the variables in the core group that 






Gender:  Specifications 1 to 3, which do not control for the employment pattern 
throughout the working life, show a higher density for men, as also is found in the 
bivariate associations in Table 7. However, the impact is reversed so that women 
have a higher density of contributions for the same employment experience in 
specifications 4 to 6. 
 
School attainment: Schooling has a positive but decreasing significant association 
with the density of contributions under all specifications in Table 14. The size of this 
association is cut to about two-fifths, however, once the labor market history is 
introducted in specification 4.  This is consistent with schooling affecting the density 
of contributions primarily through affecting labor market choices and outcomes 
regarding work category, employment and unionization. 
 
Age: Age has a positive but decreasing significant association with the density of 
contributions under all specifications in Table 14.  This is consistent with the findings 
in previous tables that the density of contributions increases with the age of the 
interviewees but at decreasing rates. The size of this association is cut to about a 
seventh, however, once the labor market history is introducted in specification 4.  
This suggests that important factors in increasing the density of contributions over 
the life cycle may include changes in employment rates and in types of employment. 
 
Household head and marital status:   Heads of households  have higher density rates 
in specifications 1-3; nevertheless, this effect is not significant when the labor 
market experience of the interviewees is controlled (from specification 4). Marital 
status does not appear to have a significant association in the most of the the 
specifications, though being married has a positive coefficient estimate in the most 
extensive specification (7).  
 
Disability:  Having a disability reduces the density of coverage by about 11 or 12 
percentage points in the simplest specifications.  However, once again, this 
association becomes insignificant once there is control for labor market experience.  
 







Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Years of schooling 0.02666 9.8* 0.02459 9.0* 0.02459 8.6* 0.00930 3.9*
Years of schooling squared -0.00076 -5.8* -0.00072 -5.5* -0.00072 -6.4* -0.00024 -2.1*
Age 0.03618 35.1* 0.03598 34.8* 0.03598 33.7* 0.00524 5.7*
Age squared -0.00034 -33.1* -0.00034 -33.0* -0.00034 -31.6* -0.00003 -3.4*
Single=1 0.00578 0.8 0.00920 1.3 0.00920 1.5 -0.00366 -0.7
Head of Household=1 0.06913 9.7* 0.07066 10.0* 0.07066 9.6* 0.00627 1.2
Disability=1 -0.12327 -11.2* -0.11830 -10.8* -0.11830 -9.3* -0.01498 -1.6
Male=1 0.12995 20.9* 0.12305 18.7* 0.12305 18.4* -0.01201 -2.3*
Poverty in childhood=1 -0.03322 -5.5* -0.03322 -4.8* -0.02231 -4.8*
Progress=1 0.05083 8.8* 0.05083 7.7* 0.02596 5.9*
Military Service=1 0.02399 3.2* 0.02399 3.3* 0.01518 2.6*
Planning Horizon=1 0.03282 5.6* 0.00992 2.4*
Smoker=1 -0.00348 -0.6 -0.01466 -3.6*
Bad Health=1 -0.05010 -4.0* -0.00273 -0.3
Labor Training=1 0.07480 12.6* 0.01781 4.3*
% as wage-worker 0.11979 12.5*
% as self/employed -0.28494 -19.6*
% of time employed 0.75075 91.3*
% of time unionized 0.06237 12.1*
R2 0.199 0.204 0.215 0.566
n 15871 15871 15799 14831
Table 14
Regressions for the density of contributions
(Dependent Variable: d=density of contributions)
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Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Years of schooling 0.00930 2.4* 0.00916 2.4* 0.01285 3.7*
Years of schooling squared -0.00022 -2.0* -0.00021 -1.9** -0.00039 -2.6*
Age 0.00513 5.6* 0.00513 5.6* 0.00309 2.3*
Age squared -0.00003 -3.3* -0.00003 -3.3* 0.00000 -0.6
Single=1 -0.00351 -0.7 -0.00341 -0.7 -0.01049 -2.0*
Head of Household=1 0.00596 1.2 0.00596 1.2 0.00582 1.1
Disability=1 -0.01492 -1.6 -0.01500 -1.6 0.00197 0.2
Male=1 -0.01239 -2.4* -0.01226 -2.3* -0.00401 -0.7
Poverty in childhood=1 -0.02116 -4.6* -0.02125 -4.6* -0.01575 -3.2*
Progress=1 0.02601 5.9* 0.02613 6.0* 0.01625 3.7*
Military Service=1 0.01454 2.5* 0.01453 2.5* 0.00802 1.3
Planning Horizon=1 0.00914 2.2* 0.00927 2.2* 0.00481 1.1
Smoker=1 -0.01404 -3.4* -0.01401 -3.4* -0.00661 -1.6
Bad Health=1 -0.00326 -0.3 -0.00338 -0.3 -0.00594 -0.5
Labor Training=1 0.01784 4.3* 0.01788 4.3* 0.01044 2.5*
% as wage-worker 0.11946 12.5* 0.11895 12.5* 0.11128 9.3*
% as self-employed -0.28476 -19.6* -0.28526 -19.7* -0.32721 -16.9*
% of time employed 0.75250 91.6* 0.75281 91.6* 0.78292 85.4*
% of time unionized 0.06293 12.0* 0.06281 12.0* 0.05508 9.9*
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Per-cap.Total Household Income -0.00000 -0.6 -0.00000 -0.8
Repeated at school=1 -0.01348 -3.1*
Knowledge of s.sec.contrib.=1 0.01216 2.8*
Knowledge of s.sec.charges=1 0.01889 2.5*
Risk averse=1 0.00876 1.9**
Propensity to consume=1 -0.02728 -4.7*
R2 0.567 0.567 0.644
n 14831 14831 10643
Notes:
-All specifications include a constant term.
-Method is Ordinary Least Squares with corrections for heteroskedasticity.
*Coefficient is significant at 5%;  **Coefficient is significant at 10%
Specification 5 Specification 6 Specification 7
Table 14
Regressions for the density of contributions
(Dependent Variable: d=density of contributions)
  35Selected variables that are added in other specifications: 
 
 
Poverty in childhood: Reported poverty in childhood is associated with a reduction of 
0.02-0.03 in the density of contributions. This association holds even when labor 
market experience is controlled. This variable could be capturing unobserved human 
capital or other unobserved individual characteristics that affect the density of 
contributions.  
 
Intergenerational progress: A dichotomous variable that indicates whether the 
individual currently has a better or much better socio-economic situation than that of 
the home in which he/she grew up is significant in every case (Progress=1): thus, 
individuals that have progressed economically since their childhood have a higher 
propensity to make social security contributions (this effect holds even when 
employment experience is controlled). 
 
Military service:  Having had military service is associated with a significantly higher 
(0.02 to 0.03) density of contributions in all the specifications except the seventh 
one.  This is consistent with those in the military learning about and developing 
habits of participating in various formal institutions. 
 
Longer planning horizon:  Individuals with a longer time horizon for planning their 
savings and family expenses have a higher density of contributions for virtually all 
specifications (the variable “Planning Horizon=1” has value of 1 if individuals 
consider one year or more as the horizon for planning their savings and family 
expenses and 0 if the horizon is less).  
 
Smoker:  In a number, but not all, of the specifications, smoking is associated 
negatively with the density of contributions.  This inverse association is consistent 
with smokers having lower discount rates or with smokers having shorter life 
expectancies, both of which might lower the density of contributions. 
 
Bad health:  Bad health is negatively associated with the density of contributions in 
specification 3, which again may be associated with expectations of less to be gained 
from the pension system due to shorter life expectancy.  But this association no 
longer is significant once labor market experience is included. 
 
Labor training:  Those with at least one labor training course since 1980 had a higher 
density. This is consistent with a positive relationship between human capital 
investment and the density of contributions. This association also weakens 
substantially with control for labor market experience. 
 
Labor market experience: As noted, a number of the associations of the core 
variables with the density of contributions weak or disappear once there is control for 
labor market experience.  The greater the proportion of time worked as a wage 
worker and the less time worked as an independent, the greater is the density of 
contributions. The density also increases substantially with higher employment rates 
of the interviewees in the last 20 years (variable % of time employed).  
 
Having repeated grade in school:  Having repeated a school year is negatively 
associated with the density of contributions.  This variable may be capturing lower 
abilities, controlling for schooling attainment. 
 
  36Knowledge of social security system:  Knowledge of some basic aspects of the 
Chilean social security system is associated with higher densities of contributions. 
Two dichotomous variables have been built: one takes 1 as its value if the affiliates 
know the percentage of the contribution to the pension system and 0 if not; and the 
other takes the value of 1 if the affiliates know the commissions charged for the 
administration of their pension funds in the AFP system and 0 if they do not. 
 
Risk aversion:  Social security savings also increase with risk aversion, as might be 
expected. A dichotomous variable with the value of 1 is used as a measure of risk 
aversion, in this case for individuals who prefer a job that guarantees a fixed and 
sure life-long income in comparison with another that may pay better but with a less 
certain income. 
 
Propensity to consume: The variable “Propensity to consume=1” has a value of  1 for 
affiliates that would dedicate that amount to consumption expenses, if they were not 
obliged to contribute; and 0 if they would to dedicate that amount to other types of 
savings and investment. The results show that a higher propensity to consume is 
correlated with lower densities of contribution. 
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4.3. Replacement rates and the density of contributions 
 
This section examines the impact of the density of contribution on income 
replacement rates.  The analysis uses the following basic assumptions: 
 
•  Initial Taxable Income: $200,000 (somewhat below twice the current minimum 
wage); 
•  Real salary grows 2% per year until 50 years of age; 
•  Pension fund return rates: 4% real annual; 
•  Fixed monthly commission: $500; 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of different scenarios in terms of accumulated 
capital at the moment of withdrawal and replacement rates. The following scenarios 
are analyzed: 
 
a)  Male who gets pension at 65 years of age with female partner 5 years younger; 
density of contributions: 80%; 
b)  Male who gets pension at 65 years of age with female partner 5 years younger; 
density of contributions: 60%; 
c)  Female who gets pension at 60 years of age; density of contributions: 80%; 
d)  Female who gets pension at 60 years of age; density of contributions: 43%; 
 
Figure 3 contains the results of social security savings up to 65 years of age (for 
men) and up to 60 years of age (for women). Figure 4, indicates the respective 
replacement rates for these cases (defined as the percentage of the last 
remunerations covered by the  monthly pension). 
 
A man with a pension at 65 and with a density of 80% accumulates a capital of $37 
million, which finances a pension that reaches nearly 60% of his pre-retirement 
remuneration. For men, this accumulated amount must also finance a survivor’s 
pension for their spouses and dependant children.  
 
The same density assumption applied to a female affiliate reflects that she has a 
lower retirement age. Thus, the accumulated savings, with the same assumptions of 
remuneration, rates of return and density of contributions, would reach $29 million. 
Considering these low savings, apart from the higher life expectancy of women, 
women have to finance a pension for longer and with less. This is partly made up by 
the fact that women do not leave a survivor pension. In this scenario, women have a 
replacement rate of 43%. 
 
However, the previous exercises assume an average density of 80%. As indicated 
above, these are the usual assumptions used in pension projections in Chile from the 
outset of the system. 
 
The impact of lower average densities is detrimental, as is observed in figures 3 and 
4. When using the effective densities of contributions of affiliates (60% for men and 
43% for women), the accumulated capital decreases between 25% and 46% with 
comparison to the scenario in which densities of 80% are assumed. In fact, the 
projected pensions decrease from 58% of the last salary (with 80% density) to 44%, 
for men, and from 43% to 23% in the case of women. 
 
  38In conclusion, it is essential to consider the effective contribution histories of the 
affiliates of the AFP system because they affect importantly the pension amounts at 
the end of the working life. This issue has been unexplored to date in the debate on 
the Chilean pension system. It is clear that densities of contributions below those 
used in the minimum pension projections would imply an increase in the projected 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications  
 
The purpose of social security is to guarantee citizens access to benefits that can 
provide them with income stability in their post-retirement years, in the case of 
individuals who can generate these savings by themselves, and a minimum 
subsistence level for those who cannot accumulate those savings on their own. 
Higher or lower social security coverage affects the capacity of workers to finance 
their own pensions once retired or to be adequately covered in case of accidents. 
Low social security coverage leads to more workers receiving only the minimum 
statutory pensions or social assistance pensions. Similarly, a low coverage implies a 
lower average value of the benefits pensioners can obtain. 
 
With regard to these considerations, it should be noted that the coverage of the 
pension system is closely tied to the limitations and restrictions of the labor market. 
The latter is constantly evolving, and is influenced by the natural changes of the 
economy and by policies. To the extent that these labor market changes increase or 
reduce the precariousness of labor relations and the incentives that workers, 
especially independent and low-income workers, have to participate in the pension 
system, there will be a direct effect on labor social security coverage. Therefore, 
labor social security coverage is an issue that should not be restricted to the sphere 
of social security or social policies, since, given the nature of the factors involved, it 
is in fact affected by virtually all public policies, especially those dealing with the 
labor market. Thus, the need arises for an integrated policy framework that may 
improve labor social security coverage, and avoid, on the one hand, negative effects 
ion the coverage and amounts of the social security benefits of the passive sector, 
and on the other hand, the fiscal risks associated with a low level of coverage. 
 
Measures focused at improving benefits, such as improvements in the levels of 
contributory and assistance pensions, and coverage extension, should be evaluated 
taking their short and long-term effects into account. Excessively generous benefits, 
in terms of amounts and requirements, increase the risk of definancing, not only 
because of the need to cover higher benefit payments, but also because loosening 
the conditions on providing benefits promotes the evasion of social security 
contributions, including pension contributions. 
 
Implementing policies to increase pension coverage is one of the pending challenges 
of the Chilean pension system. The characterization of the non-affiliated population 
that does not make contributions to the social security system is key to be able to 
design good policies and to target and reach the potential beneficiary population, a 
point that has been looked at in detail in this study.  
 
Furthermore, this study shows that it is also necessary to look at the density of 
contributions of affiliated and contributing workers in the pension system. 
 
In fact, it is common to find assumptions on the density of contribution ranging 
between 80% and 100% in the social security deficit estimates or in the calculations 
of pension amounts in the AFP system. However, the latest statistics, assembled 
from self-reporting by affiliates in the HLSS Survey, show average densities of 
around 50%. What is the impact of this lower density of contributions? The 
simulation exercises presented in this study indicate that the actual density of 
effective contributions of the various groups implies substantially lower replacement 
rates (below 25%) than assumptions of  an 80% density rate. Of course, this 
  41phenomenon presents serious repercussions on the amounts to be received by future 
pensioners and on fiscal consequences in terms of the outlay on minimum and 
assistance pensions. 
 
It should be noted that these exercises have been carried out supposing a real 
annual return rate of 4%. Given that the Chilean system has averaged real annual 
return rates of over 10% since 1981, if such rates should exist in the future, higher 
pensions could be funded. However, recent pension fund return rates show that it is 
imprudent to use higher rates for future projections. 
 
In this context, improving coverage, for low income wage as well as independent 
workers, looking for adequate social security deficit financing mechanisms, especially 
during the social security transition, promoting actuarial and financial studies, as well 
as creating mechanisms that allow the affiliate to not only have adequate information 
on the administration of their pension funds, but also to have the tools to make the 
best use of that information, are part of the pending tasks of the AFP pension 
system.     
One may gather from the above analysis that increasing the coverage of the Chilean 
pension system is a priority and requires specific policies. One of the most important 
challenges is certainly to increase the coverage for low-income workers as well as for 
women and independent workers.  
Improving the information that the insured have with regard to the pension system 
should be one of the most relevant concerns in the future. Informed decisions by 
affiliates requires an understanding of both the functioning of the system in general, as 
well as of the requirements and benefits of the various pension modalities available 
upon retirement.  
There is a widespread agreement that the information level on the private pension 
programs is minimal. This is demonstrated in the results of the HLSS Survey (see 
Bravo, 2004). As such, educational programs should be implemented, through unions 
and the mass media. This could also help the insured to decide among the pension 
options when retiring, and to further reduce the levels of migration among AFPs. A 
new social security culture must be developed as a priority in the areas of information 
and education. it is essential to program and develop mass education modules that 
allow workers to fully see the benefits and obligations that the individual 
capitalization system offers, which could also be incorporated into the school 
curriculum in secondary level schools. 
Additionally, it cannot be assumed that because policy makers tend to ignore gender 
distinctions, the policies they design are operationally neutral. Indeed, gender issues 
have not been dealt with in depth on a government, academic or political level in the 
pension system reform processes (Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos, 1999). 
The gender equality issue in social security has been targeted in developed countries 
in the last few years. Issues such as the differences in retirement age, credit in years 
of contributions for women who take care of children and elderly people, coverage 
for housewives, part-time workers, domestic help workers or in seasonal activities 
such as agriculture and the retail sector have been discussed and reforms have been 
incorporated to improve gender equity in social security in the 1990s (ILO 1993). 
In contrast, the gender dimension in Latin America as a whole has been ignored or 
studied insufficiently, even though the issue of social security and women has 
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women, to their increasing participation in the pension market as primary 
beneficiaries; and to the fact that numerous social security systems have been and 
are being reformed and to ongoing demographic changes. Though interest is 
increasing in the topic, many questions still remain unanswered. Studying the 
pension system from a gender perspective is a challenge for the future, identifying 
how the employment behavior of men and women affects the pensions of these 
groups, as well as identifying and overcoming possible system design problems that 
could negatively affect women’s pensions. 
The gender issue should not be sidelined, especially considering that the projected 
increase in the number and relative importance of the female labor force will shape, 
among other factors, the future evolution of the labor and pension markets. 
Measures aimed at risk-sharing, be it through the elimination of gender differences 
in retirement age and mortality tables, or through the creation of family accounts, 
could be an incentive to increase female participation in the system and so reduce 
the possibilities of low pension levels and increasing fiscal subsidies. 
Furthermore, the level of understanding that women have of the system should be 
known as well as the negative effect of women retiring at 60 years of age (five years 
before men) on the pension amounts, to propose information policies that allow and 
promote setting back the retirement age past the current level of 60. 
Since 1981, the State has had to cover the social security deficit created by the new 
pension system, which is currently slightly under 5% of GDP. This puts considerable 
pressure on the fiscal coffers, which should be dropping over time, as the relative 
importance of the transitory commitments of the State with the social security 
system, the operational deficit and the recognition bonds, is reduced and the 
permanent components increase, the minimum state and assistance pension 
guarantee. 
 
From this perspective, social security coverage is not neutral, in that it has an 
influence in the accumulation of resources by affiliates in the new social security 
system, and thus, in the need to finance, with State resources, minimum or 
assistance pensions. Consequently, a good fiscal practice is to push towards 
measures that improve social security coverage, thus reducing future pressures on 
the State. 
 
As regards low-income workers, employment and formalization policies should play 
the key role, avoiding opportunist behavior that reduces social security savings. The 
supervision of social security contributions should be strengthened within an 
institutional framework that ensures effect recovery of the contributions through a 
rational and efficient use of sanctions (fines and others). 
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